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Abstract
 
The technique of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) is commonly 
explained as a way of checking the genes of embryos produced by IVF for serious 
genetic diseases. However, complex accounts of this technique emerged during 
ethics discussion groups held for PGD staff. These form part of a study exploring 
the social processes, meanings and institutions that frame and produce ‘ethical 
problems’ for practitioners, scientists and others working in the specialty of PGD 
in the UK. Two ‘grey areas’ raised by staff are discussed in terms of how far staff 
are, or in the future may be, able to support autonomous choices of women/
couples: accepting ‘carrier’ embryos within the goal of creating a ‘healthy’ child; 
and sex selection of embryos for social reasons. These grey areas challenged the 
staff’s resolve to offer individual informed choice, in the face of their awareness 
of possible collective social effects that might ensue from individual choices. We 
therefore argue that these new forms of choice pose a challenge to conventional 
models of individual autonomy used in UK genetic and reproductive counselling, 
and that ‘relational autonomy’ may be a more suitable ethical model to describe 
the ethical principles being drawn on by staff working in this area.
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Introduction
 
The technique of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) is commonly explained, for
example, as:
‘A way of checking the genes of three-day-old embryos produced by IVF for serious 
genetic diseases . . . In the laboratory, one or two cells are extracted from the embryo and 
are examined for speciﬁc genetic faults’ (HFEA 2005: 34).
Re-use of this article is permitted in accordance with the Creative Commons Deed, 
Attribution 2.5, which does not permit commercial exploitation. 
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In this paper we explore the social and ethical implications for staff arising from the more
complicated accounts of this technique given by practitioners, scientists and others working
in PGD in the UK. We wish to make clear from the outset that the model of individual
autonomy referred to here is based on a particular view of ethics, and dependent on
the medical and wider cultural, historical and legal context in which it occurs, and as
such would clearly differ from those in other countries. Speciﬁcally, we focus on staff
views about the part that women/couples play in deciding which embryo(s) to replace in
PGD, where the goal is to have a particular kind of baby, that is, not simply ‘a’ baby,
but a ‘healthy baby’. This presents novel dilemmas compared to those commonly raised
in relation to in vitro fertilisation (IVF) or prenatal diagnosis (PND), and arguably
puts women/couples in an unprecedented position in relation to reproductive technology,
in ‘an arena where medicine, social values and culturally determined meaning are closely
intertwined’ (Getz and Kirkengen 2003: 2054). In IVF procedures, embryos for implanta-
tion are selected by embryologists, but, as will be explained in more detail later, PGD
potentially offers women/couples the opportunity to play a greater role in selecting the
embryos to be transferred. With PND, women/couples can use the information from tests
to choose whether or not to 
 
continue
 
 a pregnancy; but following PGD, women/couples
can decide which embryos (if any) to have transferred for implantation 
 
before
 
 becoming
pregnant. We sought the views of staff about the social and ethical dilemmas these situa-
tions might raise, and how they see their own participation in facilitating and framing
these choices.
We report on two sets of dilemmas highlighted by staff as representing social and ethical
‘grey areas’ which have opened up since the introduction of PGD. The ﬁrst concerns
the ultimate goal of PGD to achieve a ‘healthy baby’. The issue here is whether this goal
should include accepting embryos with a ‘carrier’ test result. These embryos would not
usually be expected to develop into children with signiﬁcant symptoms themselves, but the
children could potentially pass on the relevant genes to their own offspring. Thus, selecting
only completely unaffected embryos and not carriers could be seen as extending the goals
of PGD beyond the health of the immediate child in question. The second set of dilemmas
concerns choosing the sex of embryos for social reasons. Although this is currently illegal
in the UK, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 is under review and this
issue is subject to much debate. Part of the remit of our project is to explore potential
dilemmas that might occur, ahead of time, so that staff have time to think about the issues,
and to inform policy makers about their views of possible developments. In addition,
although laboratory procedures make information about the sex of embryos available in
speciﬁc cases such as where a condition is sex linked, technological advances mean that this
information is likely to become increasingly available and therefore women/couples could
potentially take this knowledge into consideration when making choices.
We argue that these new possibilities for women/couples using reproductive technologies
for genetic reasons pose a challenge to conventional models of autonomy used in genetic
and reproductive counselling. Attempts to accommodate unprecedented types of decision-
making within an ethos of informed choice and non-directive counselling may create prob-
lems as much for staff as for women and their partners (Williams, Alderson and Farsides
2002a). In presenting the views and experiences of staff who are involved in offering
women/couples these choices, we build on the ﬁndings of Farsides, Williams and Alderson
(2005), that practitioners working in the closely related ﬁeld of antenatal care do not
necessarily hold homogenous moral views; and Williams’ (2006) discussion of practition-
ers’ complex efforts to ‘manage’ new types of medical uncertainty. This paper therefore
offers a contribution to the growing number of sociological and anthropological studies 
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exploring the ways in which ethical dilemmas and reﬂection occur in the clinical situation
(Haimes 2002, Hedgecoe 2004).
 
Clinical background
 
There are important distinctions between the associated techniques of IVF and PGD that
we highlight here to explain why PGD raises unprecedented ethical and social issues. PGD
is offered to women/couples who are at risk of having a child with a serious genetic
condition, although The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) has
recently widened the scope for PGD, to include susceptibility to later onset cancer condi-
tions such as inherited breast cancer. PGD can also help women/couples who have experienced
repeated miscarriage due to chromosome rearrangements such as reciprocal translocation
(Braude 
 
et al.
 
 2002). One of the key advantages of PGD is to avoid repeated termination
of pregnancies following antentatal diagnosis of genetic disease, which may have serious
and long-term effects on women/couples (Lavery 
 
et al.
 
 2002). The live birth rate for IVF
varies according to factors including the age of women and whether the embryos used are
fresh or frozen. Clinics claim success rates ranging from less than 10 per cent for women
over 40, up to 59 per cent for women below 35 (HFEA 2005), with a commonly cited
average rate of between 20–25 per cent. Success rates for PGD are often lower, because
genetic diagnosis excludes embryos for transfer.
The goal of IVF is to assist women/couples to achieve pregnancy, and embryologists make
decisions about which embryos to transfer based on established criteria for the quality of
each embryo. This relates to morphological grading, which includes factors such as the clear
categorisation of the rate of cleavage, and size and clarity of individual cells. In contrast, the
choice between embryos in PGD involves consideration of many additional factors. After
genetic testing, a choice may need to be made between embryos according to a range of
diagnostic information, including whether the embryo is a carrier or completely free of the
genetic condition. For each embryo a calculation is made for the risk of misdiagnosis. Account
is also taken of the way in which disease is inherited and how penetrant the disease is – that
is, how certain it is that a person carrying a faulty gene will be affected by the condition.
In PGD, there is the potential for women/couples to play a more central role in selecting
(an) embryo(s) for transfer. The main reason is that practitioners and scientists, drawing on
complex biomedical and clinical knowledge, present women/couples with information and
risk factors for each embryo considered viable. Staff stress that few women/couples have
more than two embryos suitable for transfer per PGD cycle, and it would be quite possible
that the only viable embryo might be a carrier. The HFEA currently allows two, or excep-
tionally three, embryos to be transferred after diagnosis, but UK regulations on this are
under review and it is likely that because of the dangers of multiple pregnancies and births,
only one embryo will be transferred in future. It is therefore possible that the opportunities
and dilemmas presented by having to choose between embryos may become more common
in PGD in the near future.
 
Relational autonomy
 
In the UK, decision-making in this area of reproductive healthcare is usually discussed
within an ethical framework of supporting individual choice and the principle of autonomy
for women/couples (see for example Soini 
 
et al
 
. 2006). However, the creation of children 
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and the selection of embryos implicates staff in ways about which they may feel ambivalent,
including dilemmas about the wider social impact of individual choices (Ehrich 
 
et al
 
. 2006,
Brock 2005). Conventional models of autonomy have been criticised for emphasising
individual choice, and for paying insufﬁcient attention to wider social contexts in which
reproductive technologies both shape and are affected by such choices (Sherwin 1998,
Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000).
In a study of lay views on PGD for social sex selection, Scully, Banks and Shakespeare
(2006) found that participants were doubtful about the unequivocal beneﬁts of choice in
general, and were aware that reproductive choice in particular might be morally problematic.
Participants almost universally agreed that the voluntary relinquishment of 
 
control
 
 over
such issues as sex selection for social reasons was fundamental to being a ‘good parent’, even
if sex selection by PGD did not in itself present a special harm or advantage to the child.
Yet they also agreed that there were limits to the virtue of acceptance, so that selecting an
embryo through PGD would be acceptable if the purpose was to avoid having a child with
a serious genetic disease or impairment. Participants acknowledged the difﬁculty in deciding
exactly where the transition should be between appropriate relinquishing of control, and an
externally regulated ability to choose. They were also highly sensitive as to the processes
through which individual moral choices could collectively lead to a ‘slippery slope’. Similarly,
in Petersen’s (2006) study of the experiences of people with genetic conditions and their
reproductive options, some participants expressed concerns about possible future offspring, lead-
ing them to favour what was fair or right for the child’s future, rather than their own desires.
Our study can be seen as complementary to Scully 
 
et al.
 
’s (2006) and Petersen’s (2006)
work with lay people and people with genetic conditions, because it provides information
on how staff regard similar ethical issues. Importantly, participants in Scully and colleagues’
and Petersen’s studies demonstrate a form of reasoning that contrasts with the secular-liberal
ethical framework common in Western bioethics, in which reproductive choice is seen as
an expression of personal liberty and autonomy. Instead, these authors consider the concept
of parental self-determination within the model of relational autonomy (Sherwin 1998,
Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000), which, ‘stresses the 
 
non-individualistic
 
 nature of the moral
agent. It depicts the autonomous human as being inescapably constituted through relational
networks’ (Scully 
 
et al.
 
 2006: 30, emphasis in the original). In Scully 
 
et
 
 
 
al.
 
’s (2006) study,
parents saw voluntary self-limitation of choices as constitutive of the ‘good parent’s’ identity,
and felt that parental autonomy was only possible within the limits set up by this framework.
The relational autonomy approach has been developed by feminists, who emphasise that
an analysis of the characteristics and capacities of autonomous agents needs to take into
account their emotional, embodied, desiring, creative and feeling, as well as rational,
nature, within complex social and historical contexts (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000: 21). Dodds
(2000)  claims that autonomy has been conceived in much of the bioethics literature as
equivalent to informed consent, thus restricting the exercise of autonomy to making
choices within a narrow set of options, which have been ‘marked out by the institutional
framework of healthcare provision, including healthcare resources, [and] medical
education . . .’ (Dodds 2000: 223). She argues that
‘an appropriate, relational approach will attend not just to health-care 
 
choices
 
 but also to 
the ways in which health-care practices can contribute to the development and shaping 
of people’s capacity for autonomy’ (2000: 214).
Donchin (2000) claims more speciﬁcally that background norms, practices, social struc-
tures, and institutions conﬁgure and limit options for 
 
genetic
 
 decision-making, and that the 
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‘self-determining self’ is continually remaking itself, in response to changing relationships
with others (2000: 239). This emphasises the ongoing nature of relational autonomy as part
of a contingent, and continually emergent and accomplished social order (Allen 1997,
Casper 1998). Dodds and Donchin are primarily concerned with drawing attention to how
socialisation and social relationships within particular historical and social conditions
impede or enhance autonomy for reproductive healthcare users.
In this paper, we report on ethically contentious areas which UK staff have raised in
relation to the use of a particular model of choice, where the historical and legal context
differs from those in other countries. We consider the range of moral positions and prob-
lems that working within an ethos of informed, individual choice, as used in the UK, can
pose for PGD staff. We pay particular attention to how staff shape information, and
conﬁgure or frame options for women/couples. We argue that relational autonomy may
provide a better model of autonomy for the kinds of decision-making they are engaged in
with women/couples choosing embryos following PGD.
 
Methods
 
This paper reports on one aspect of an ongoing project which explores the actual 
 
and potential
 
ethical, social, clinical and legal dilemmas that genetic developments and new reproductive
technologies pose for practitioners, scientists, policy makers and others working in the
specialty of PGD. We are examining inﬂuences on, and interactions between, different disci-
plines, and exploring the social processes, meanings and institutions that frame and pro-
duce ‘ethics’ and ‘ethical problems’. The project uses multiple methods to study two sites (only
one of which is drawn upon here), both Assisted Conception Units in teaching hospitals
in England which offer a mixture of National Health Service (NHS), private or ‘self-
funded’ NHS treatment. The clinics provide a range of services including IVF and PGD.
Following Ethics Committee approval, the research has included running ethics discussion
groups (EDGs) with staff from a range of disciplines including nursing, obstetrics and
gynaecology, radiography, embryology, molecular and cyto-genetics, and administration,
selected because their work involves contact with women/couples undergoing PGD. The groups
were facilitated by a healthcare ethicist (BF), and were of mixed disciplines and seniority.
This innovative methodology has been used successfully in two previous studies by two of
the authors, BF and CW (Alderson, Farsides and Williams 2002, Wainwright 
 
et al.
 
 in press).
The paper draws on ﬁve such groups with four to six participants in each (23 participants
in total), carried out between October and December 2005. Topics for the groups were
generated from a content analysis of 26 interviews previously carried out with individual
staff, and by asking interviewees what issues they felt could usefully be discussed in EDGs.
Topics identiﬁed included views on treatment eligibility for PGD; views about the genetic
conditions that should be tested for; and the efﬁcacy of regulatory bodies such as the HFEA.
Most of those interviewed participated in an EDG, and some groups included staff who were
not interviewed. Groups lasted two hours, and all of the discussions were tape-recorded.
Group transcripts were analysed using a modiﬁed version of the framework approach
(Ritchie and Spencer 1994). The transcripts were examined for emergent themes. ‘Choosing
embryos’, ‘carrier embryos’ and ‘sex selection’ were identiﬁed as themes capturing areas in
which staff experienced dilemmas, or ethical and social ‘grey areas’, which have opened up since
the introduction of PGD. Sections of the transcripts relating to these themes were then
grouped together and analysed further to generate sub-topics. Study numbers are used to protect
anonymity, and reference to occupations is in general terms rather than speciﬁc job titles. 
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‘Carrier’ embryos and the ‘healthy child’
 
In this section we discuss two intertwined themes. The ﬁrst is the classiﬁcation of embryos
using concepts such as ‘healthy’, ‘unaffected’ and ‘carrier’. The second theme describes
staff attempts to facilitate and frame women’s/couples’ choices between embryos in these
categories, which also relates to the possible wider social effects of testing and choices.
 
Classiﬁcation of the embryo
 
When using the categories of ‘healthy child’, or ‘unaffected’ embryo, some staff include
embryos with carrier status and assume the acceptability to women/couples of carrier
embryos being transferred. According to this view, the goal of helping women/couples have
a ‘healthy baby’ can be achieved because a person can carry disease-linked mutations but
not manifest the disease symptoms in their own lifetime. Choosing to replace only embryos
that are not carriers could be associated with a ‘stronger’ (Shakespeare 1998) or ‘positive’
(Buchanan 
 
et al.
 
 2000) form of eugenics, because the effect would be to eliminate that
genetic anomaly for future generations, as well as the current one.
For women/couples undergoing PGD there may be a conﬂict between wanting to choose
a non-carrier embryo and having a child at all, because so few embryos result in a success-
ful pregnancy. Whilst most staff are keen to ensure that women/couples have a ‘healthy’
baby (
 
i.e.
 
 possibly a carrier), some were sympathetic to those who did not want to accept
carrier embryos, because they hoped to spare their child from similar dilemmas in their
future reproductive life. In the EDGs, some diverse assumptions and practices amongst
staff emerged:
Scientist, 2: . . . we say to them, ‘Look you’ve got a selection of embryos, do you want 
carriers or do you want normals put back?’ Because that’s up to the 
patients ultimately . . . 
Scientist, 8: They’ll have a normal baby whatever. So you’re giving them the choice.
Doctor, 22: Do you choose carriers over the normals? I mean do you choose the best 
embryos?
Scientist, 2: Yes we look for the best embryo, but sometimes if there’s a choice, you’ve 
got two good embryos or there are three, and you know, you’ve got the 
carriers and the normals . . . but some of them have got an objection to 
having a carrier child. So we, they, select just the normals to go back, 
because they don’t want a child to have to go through what they’ve gone 
through . . . (EDG 2)
This illustrates some differences in the use of classiﬁcations and assumptions that may
be held by members of staff. Whilst Scientist 2 contrasts ‘carrier’ embryos with
‘normals’, Scientist 8 sees the carrier embryo as leading to a ‘normal’ baby; the doctor’s
question, however, implies that choosing the ‘best’ embryo does not necessarily exclude
‘carriers’. These classiﬁcations are not purely technical, but carry social meanings, as,
for example, when Scientist 2 acknowledges that some couples only want to transfer
non-carrier embryos because they do not want their child ‘to have to go through what
they’ve gone through’. Such distinctions support the ﬁnding of Farsides, Williams and
Alderson (2005), that in large multidisciplinary teams, it should not be assumed that
members hold entirely homogenous views, as indicated here by their different classiﬁcations
of embryos. 
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Choice, carrier status and a ‘healthy’ baby
 
The language of offering women/couples choice was a key theme throughout the EDGs,
but the possibility of allowing women/couples not to accept ‘carriers’ was evidently not
welcomed by some staff:
Counsellor, 28: You give people a choice?
Scientist, 2: Yes.
Counsellor, 28: I didn’t know you did that, I have to say.
Scientist, 8: I didn’t know that.
Counsellor, 28: I feel that’s, I feel very uncomfortable with that, very uncomfortable. 
I didn’t know you did it (EDG 2).
These comments illustrate the recurrent theme that many staff recognised that such decisions
could have potential social implications beyond the immediate family or medical team, thereby
emphasising a collective sensibility more in keeping with a relational model of autonomy.
The different practices in IVF and PGD regarding women/couples selecting embryos are
highlighted in the following exchange in EDG 5. Embryologist 33 works mainly in IVF,
whilst Scientist 2 also works in PGD:
Embryologist, 33: Why are [PGD] patients picking the embryos? I don’t understand, 
when just normal IVF patients . . . 
Scientist, 2: No, no, but in PGD they have maybe four embryos available and of 
those maybe two look about right – and if you’re lucky you’ve got 
three that are potentially implantable. And then, you know, it’s up to 
them, of those three, which ones.
Embryologist, 33: Why is it up to the patients? . . . Normal IVF patients go through 
and they show up at transfer and we say, ‘These two are the best, 
they’re the ones we’re putting back today’.
Scientist, 2: Because we have to give them the risks . . . you have to give them the 
risks associated with each of those embryos . . . And we say, ‘From 
our point of view, we would prefer to put this one back because it’s 
got the lowest chance of misdiagnosis . . . but this one’s a carrier’.
This extract illustrates how the goal of achieving a successful pregnancy through IVF is
different from the goal in PGD, which is to choose the embryo(s) most likely to develop
into a ‘healthy’ child. It also illustrates how views differed as to how much choice and
information should be offered to women/couples. In IVF the choice is a more limited,
technical assessment of the viability and quality of the embryo whereas in PGD, the infor-
mation includes genetic diagnosis, making the choice a more intricate and socially signi-
ﬁcant one. PGD staff are thus put in the position of giving women/couples technical
information and conveying complex knowledge, whilst simultaneously shaping the infor-
mation in light of the social implications the choice will carry:
Scientist, 2: Obviously you wouldn’t turn round and say, ‘Take that one, it’s an 
absolutely horrible looking embryo but it’s normal, the rest are all carriers 
– that’s a normal one, but it’s not going to get you pregnant’ . . . you give 
them advice and you don’t tell them what to do . . . I mean you say the 
things in a way that, you know, makes it sound like, ‘this is the best one.’ 
Obviously in terms of morphology, you say, ‘this has got the best chance of  
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implanting,’ but they have to have the other information as well to make 
their decision. And at the end of the day it’s their embryos . . . So if they 
decide not to have the normals put back and have the carriers, they have to 
live with the decision that when that child is growing up, that child might 
have some problems, but it was the one that had the nicest looking 
embryo . . . They have to live with that decision they make. So you can’t 
just be, ‘We think it’s this one, you should have this one’.
The social implications of having to consider that the child might have ‘problems’, and
having to live with their decision, are clearly ones the scientist feels should inform the
woman’s/couple’s decision. At the same time, staff may struggle with the challenge of
communicating a great deal of specialist knowledge. For example, if a woman/couple wish
to eliminate a condition for future generations, they might prefer to accept an ‘unaffected’
embryo with a higher risk of misdiagnosis, rather than a ‘carrier’ embryo with a lower risk
of misdiagnosis. This illustrates further how information may be negotiated according to a
combination of the interests of the woman/couple contemplating the possibility of bringing
up a child who might have ‘problems’; the signiﬁcance of degrees of certainty in the diag-
nosis; and the staff’s professional goals and values. The scientist’s description of framing
the choice in this way appears to be an attempt to bridge these considerations within a
professional commitment to the ethos of individual choice.
In this section it can be seen that staff held a range of views about women’s/couples’
decision-making concerning ‘carrier’ embryos, to some extent reﬂecting the different treatment
goals of IVF and PGD. The framing of such information in ways that incorporate possible
social implications of choices, together with support for women’s/couples’ autonomy, can be
seen as attempting to create a bridge between professional knowledge, individual autonomy
and wider social, ethical and professional values. We argue that these bridging attempts illus-
trate how relational autonomy might better ﬁt the ethical framework of staff at this clinic.
 
Sex selection for social reasons
 
Although it is currently illegal in the UK to allow sex selection of embryos for social reasons,
some staff anticipated difﬁculties in relation to the potential desire of some women/couples
to ‘add on’ sex selection as another possibility when going through PGD. In this section,
we present dilemmas that staff discussed in relation to the possibility of sex selection for
social reasons, grouped into three themes. The ﬁrst theme relates to weighing harms that
might follow from the consequences of facilitating fully informed choice. The second theme
concerns framing choices with the effect of prioritising the potential health and social
interests of the child over women’s/couples’ preferences for a child of a particular sex. The
third theme relates to the varying views of staff coming from different occupational or
disciplinary backgrounds in their attitudes to supporting individual choice in this area.
 
Weighing of harms and information giving
 
Although staff were clear that women/couples would not currently be allowed to use PGD
purely for sex selection on social grounds, many were unhappy that information about the
sex of the embryo could potentially be used in the future by women/couples, to select
embryos of a particular sex. Awareness of this possibility had led staff in a particular case
in the past to consider withholding information about the sex of embryos, because they did
not want to assist women/couples in choosing embryos using this criterion. For some staff, 
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however, withholding that information could be problematic. Members of EDG 1 referred
to the ethos of giving full information to clients as a key value. Withholding information
in this scenario thus failed to resolve their dilemmas completely, because withholding
information was an uncomfortable stance to take professionally:
Counsellor, 10: With this couple we were actually choosing to withhold information 
from them, and that was our choice as a team. And I think now we’ve 
felt less comfortable with that.
Scientist, 19: Yes, it’s all because you’re withholding information. It is . . . about 
what your stand is and the fact that you have information and you’ve 
decided not to give that to them. You can be equally as uncomfortable 
with that as to . . . the other sort of consideration.
Further, decisions to withhold information, based on perceived good intentions, could lead
to unintended consequences that might be worse than the harm being avoided. A member
of EDG 4 raised this dilemma by referring to a case in which such information was withheld
following prenatal diagnosis, making a comparison with withholding this information at
the PGD embryo transfer stage. The scenario concerned a case from another clinic in
which a couple were suspected of having prenatal diagnosis mainly in order to detect the
sex of the fetus. The staff feared this information would lead to termination of a female
fetus, so they decided not to report it to the couple:
Scientist, 3: The fetus was actually male. The couple terminated the pregnancy anyway, 
because they didn’t want to take the risk that it might be female . . . to me 
that was a very good lesson, in that sometimes you can try to intervene for 
the best of reasons, and actually it still goes horribly wrong.
The lesson being drawn here was that weighing the harms and deciding to withhold infor-
mation led to unintended consequences that the staff were equally uncomfortable with: it
all went ‘
 
horribly wrong
 
’ and a male fetus (which the couple wanted) was aborted (which
the staff wanted to avoid).
The discussions concerning these dilemmas illustrate the difﬁculties staff reported in weighing
possible harms to women and female fetuses that they saw as ﬂowing from giving women/couples
information which might be used to facilitate social sex selection, whether that facilitation was
intentional or not. These dilemmas included awareness of untoward and unintended consequences.
Dilemmas could also relate to potential harms to the staff themselves, in terms of their
professional standards, personal consciences and the law; or conversely, saving their own
consciences at the expense of women. The harm of denying their professional ethos to give
full information was weighed by EDG 2 against the harm to their conscience when con-
sidering the consequences for the woman:
Counsellor, 28: We’re not contributing to the termination of a female fetus [by 
disclosing the sex of the fetus], so therefore, in one sense, we’re kind of 
squeaky clean. . . . but as this poor woman comes back after her third 
late termination . . . probably done under not such ideal 
conditions . . . , you know, we feel less squeaky clean . . . 
Scientist, 8: But I don’t see that giving her the same information that every other 
woman in the department gets is in some way dirtying your hands. I  
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mean she’s going to ﬁnd out later and she will have a later termination 
and so, in a way, it’s saving your own conscience at her expense.
Even if social sex selection became legal, some staff would not be happy with the conse-
quences of giving full information when women’s/couples’ expression of autonomy might
result in practices of which staff did not approve. At the same time, some staff also found
that deciding 
 
not
 
 to give information that might facilitate such choices could be problem-
atic, because withholding information conﬂicted with the value of giving women/couples
all the information generated as an obligation within the ethos of supporting fully-informed
choice and individual expression of autonomy (Williams, Alderson and Farsides (2002b).
In the EDGs, staff engaged in articulating their own views about the acceptability of
some choices, and in attempts to limit choices accordingly. It seemed that the model of
individual autonomy that they ostensibly espoused did not turn out entirely to ﬁt their
negotiation and support of women’s/couples’ choices. Instead we consider that relational
autonomy better describes the ways in which the staff’s work is informed by an awareness
of the wider social, legal, emotional and professional context and implications of their
work and women’s/couples’ choices, rather than a narrower focus on the woman’s/couple’s
immediate interests.
 
Choice, sex selection, and a successful pregnancy
 
Many staff were uncomfortable with allowing preferences for a child of a particular sex to
take priority over the potential for particular embryos to implant successfully and ulti-
mately to develop into a ‘healthy baby’. The clinical scenario referred to is that 
 
if 
 
there are
more than two embryos available for transfer in a cycle, a decision needs to be made about
which embryos to select, taking into account a range of factors relating to the quality and
genetic status of the embryo. Since the ethos is not to withhold information from women/
couples, including information about the sex of the embryo, some staff were concerned that
decisions could, in the future, be dominated by that factor, rather than the likelihood of a
successful pregnancy. In this situation, staff would see their role as trying to frame the
information so as to highlight their goal of achieving a successful pregnancy, yet maintain-
ing an ethos of facilitating choice for the couple:
Scientist, 19: We would be going on the embryo quality at that stage. That gets the 
ﬁrst ranking, and then the second ranking comes in on the genetics or 
status we’ve given, so in that way, hopefully there isn’t a decision. If 
there is, if you do know quality-wise, it’s that the two best ones go in.
Counsellor, 10: . . . ultimately you do put it to the couple that it is their decision. So 
they then are taking the decision, ‘am I more likely to get pregnant on 
the cycle, or am I really, really wanting that male pregnancy, and less 
worried about actually achieving a pregnancy?’ And I think if you put 
it to the couple like that, ultimately they’re their embryos and it’s their 
decision (EDG 1).
In these comments the ﬁrst priority for the scientist is the quality of the embryo, then the
genetic status, so that ‘hopefully there isn’t a decision’ about the sex of the embryo. The
‘hopefully’ may refer to not wishing to facilitate sex selection for social reasons, or a wish
to avoid an ethically contentious issue. The counsellor espouses the conventional ethos of
supporting the couple’s own decision, yet this is a delicate balance to achieve in practice. 
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A bridge is attempted by acknowledging that for some couples a male pregnancy is an
extremely desired goal – it is what the couple ‘really really’ want. On the other hand, the
counsellor puts the choice in terms of women/couples choosing the male embryo, but
possibly failing to get pregnant. If the staff ‘put it to the couple like that’, they can fulﬁl
their professional commitment to supporting women’s/couples’ choice, whilst framing the
question in a way that could suggest it would be illogical to pursue the aim of having a
male child to the point of not getting pregnant at all.
In this way we can see that although the staff use the language of patient choice, there
may be a subtle framing of information in particular ways. This framing can be seen as an
attempt to create a bridge between supporting women/couples to make choices but at the
same time hoping that their choices will not conﬂict with professional values. These include
the view that successful pregnancy and the birth of a healthy child should take priority over
social sex selection. We suggest that these ‘bridging’ attempts illustrate how the inclusion
of professional values represents an extension to the conventional model of individual
autonomy, and that this is captured by the concept of relational autonomy.
 
The inﬂuence of different occupational/disciplinary backgrounds
 
In the following exchange, differences between procedures followed by those working pri-
marily in IVF and those followed in PGD, indicate how occupational differences in expe-
rience and practice can overlap with personal views, so that the overall team contains a
range of opinions and moral views:
Embryologist, 33: . . . Without knowing the sex, [in IVF] we look at a cohort of 
embryos, and we go: ‘This is the best one’. We have that information 
when we know the sex of the embryo . . . but we still look at the 
embryos and go: ‘This is the best one, it’s the one we should be 
putting back’, regardless of what sex it is . . . 
Scientist, 2: But what will happen with PGD is you’ll have three embryos, that is, 
when we’re lucky if we get three nice embryos. And [in terms of 
quality] . . . they’re much of a muchness and one is a boy and two 
girls, or two boys and one a girl. And then you’ll be saying, ‘Right, 
okay, they’ll [couple] make the ﬁnal decision which ones we pick 
based on sex’, because they’ll know from the test which one’s which. 
And because they’re much of a muchness, they may even go for a bit 
better one or a bit less one just because of the sex of the embryos, 
because at the end of the day, that’s what they’d like.
Embryologist, 33: But there’s still a distinction. You still have that mild distinction 
from an embryological point of view as to which ones would look 
the best for development.
EDG facilitator: And would you always want that to be the trump card?
Embryologist, 33: Yes (EDG 5).
Here, it becomes clear that the scientist and embryologist agree they would both like the
couple to choose according to the quality of the embryo, but the scientist’s experience of
people making choices in PGD is that sometimes it seems that women/couples would like
to include in their decision the sex of the child they would prefer. Thus PGD poses new
dilemmas for staff in potentially facilitating choices that are not offered in IVF. In a sense
PGD is a hybrid of fertility and genetics technologies, so staff from those and other disci-
plines have to learn not only about each other’s clinical practices, but also, their ethical 
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approaches. During the EDGs, such a learning process was sometimes visible with profes-
sionals discovering some differences as well as similarities.
This section has explored how staff talked about potential dilemmas relating to facilitat-
ing and framing social sex selection in the PGD clinic. These dilemmas include reconciling
their belief in individual autonomy as a key value with the reality that women/couples can
potentially exercise that autonomy in ways they might ﬁnd objectionable, and the knowl-
edge that limiting information can lead to unintended consequences. In some cases staff
may frame the information given to women/couples in particular ways to bridge the gap
between somewhat conﬂicting values. Therefore, the technological assistance they offer
women/couples, together with their own professional and personal values, all play a part
in shaping the conditions and context of decision-making. We suggest that the concept of
relational autonomy, as opposed to individual autonomy, better describes the principles
and practices underlying the ways that staff frame choice for women/couples, because it
acknowledges that the women’s/couples’ choices are inﬂuenced by, and have an impact
upon, the staff’s personal, professional and moral interests, values and practices (Mackenzie
and Stoljar 2000). Our data also support Donchin’s (2000) use of relational autonomy as
a concept that captures how the ‘self-determining self’ continually remakes itself in
response to changing relationships with others, including the ways in which institutions
conﬁgure and limit options. Finally, differences between the goals, values and experiences
of different occupational groups may also play a part in how choices are conﬁgured, and
contribute to our understanding of some of the dilemmas posed by the multidisciplinary
nature of PGD.
 
Discussion and conclusions
 
Individual patient choice has been a dominant rhetoric in UK health policy over the past
two decades, but how far can the notion be stretched when it involves such complex
information, decisions, and potential inﬂuences from and on society? In what ways do
healthcare staff mediate the effects of broader social relations and inﬂuences on women/
couples and their choices, and the effects of those choices on society? The proliferation of
studies on individual women’s/couples’ choices in relation to genetic and reproductive tech-
nologies contrasts with the comparative lack of attention to the people who implement
these technologies (Kerr 2004). This paper helps ﬁll this gap by reporting on a series of
multidisciplinary EDGs held for staff to explore some of these wider questions.
The staff who participated in the EDGs espoused the consensus that PGD as a technique
is justiﬁed to help women/couples known to be at high risk of having a child with a serious
genetic condition to select an ‘unaffected’ embryo in the hopes of having a ‘healthy child’.
However, they did not hold completely homogenous views when more complex versions of
this narrative emerged in the groups and for some of the participants, the complexities took
them into unwelcome areas. Even though in each of the scenarios discussed, the testing
being done is to detect markers for speciﬁc genetic conditions, the nature of the tests
potentially allows for more problematic additional choices to be made. While the simpler
purpose or narrative of ‘selecting unaffected embryos’ would pose fewer ethical dilemmas
for most staff, the more complex choices that the tests entail bring the staff into territory
that is not so closely deﬁned by the principle of seeking to reduce or prevent harm. For
example, allowing women/couples to reject carrier embryos is seen by some staff as a less
acceptable form of eugenics, ensuring the eradication of the genetic ‘problem’ for future
generations beyond the future of the child being created; while others accept this as a 
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means of preventing suffering. The future possibility of facilitating sex selection for social
reasons is seen by some staff as unacceptable assistance to enable women/couples to act on
social wishes rather than preventing a medically deﬁned harm; whilst others do not object
to it so strongly. The EDGs allowed us to map these ethical ‘grey areas’ for staff in this
UK setting, and to see how these had arisen in the context of particular developments in
technology, and differences in the experience and practices of particular occupational
groups (Farsides 
 
et al.
 
 2005).
Consensus was also expressed that a key value of their service is to assist women/couples
making informed choices during their treatment. However, while ostensibly promoting
individual choice within a guiding ethical framework of ‘secular-liberal autonomy’, it
seemed that staff support for individual autonomy had its limits. Our study complements
the ﬁndings of Scully 
 
et al.
 
 (2006) because, like the lay participants in that study, staff
expressed doubts that choice was always positive. They were sensitive to the wider impli-
cations of individual choices, and were not sure that expressing preferences for a child of
a particular sex was a commendable attribute of potential parents. Discussion of practice
implicitly confronted staff with the question of whether patient choice is a desirable policy
to espouse per se, or whether it should be offered within a limited range of options and
outcomes (Williams, Alderson and Farsides, 2002c). The clinic’s ethos is to support women/
couples by providing full information with which to make choices. Many of them, however,
felt uncomfortable with the possibility of facilitating women’s/couples’ particular choices in
practice. As Pilnick (2002) comments in relation to withholding information about the sex
of the fetus:
‘it is highly problematic to offer screening and testing and to ask people to make an 
informed choice on the basis of these test results, if we then tell them that their choice is 
unacceptable’ (2002: 76–77).
Our ﬁndings support and extend Pilnick’s view, because we argue that in many ways,
withholding information can be as problematic for staff as it is for women/couples
(Williams 
 
et al.
 
 2002b). If sex selection is allowed in the UK in the future, it could be that
their commitment to give full information might change. Staff in our study had developed
an acute awareness of these complexities, and experienced uncertainty and ambivalence
themselves about the wider social context and effects of their work on women’s/couples’
choices, and the implications of their involvement in facilitating these choices. They were
sometimes caught between that awareness and their professional and personal imperatives
to shape the process.
This paper has mapped some of the choices women/couples make, and could potentially
make in relation to PGD, and some possible unintended consequences that might follow
from staff attempting to shape choices. Ettore (1999) suggests that too much information
can ultimately make people more dependent on medical professionals, and many other
studies in reproductive medicine have shown that staff acknowledge how, if information is
put in a particular way, women/couples will often ‘go along’ with what is, in effect, being
recommended (
 
e.g.
 
 Press and Browner 1997, Rothman 1986). In this sense we can see that
PGD staff shape the information, and not solely in the technical sphere of information. As
Williams 
 
et al.
 
 (2002a) found in relation to pre-natal screening, the boundary between choice
and coercion is not a clearcut one for health practitioners, with slippage occurring between
these concepts. The opportunities for slippage in giving the diagnostic information follow-
ing PGD include those afforded by the use of languages of risk, probability, and social
implications that may be inferred in such classiﬁcations as ‘carrier’, ‘affected’, ‘unaffected’, 
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‘normal’ and ‘best/good’ embryos. These categories can also reﬂect differences in profes-
sional experience and practice.
It has been argued that diagnostic information to inform choice may be conveyed in a
language of risk and probability (Rapp 1999, Webster 2002) yet still contain personal,
social and professional values, and our ﬁndings support this. However, rather than suggest-
ing our data support critiques of social control in reproductive and genetic healthcare, we
consider that staff appeared to be operating according to principles that would better ﬁt
within a model of relational autonomy. When staff discussed the more difﬁcult ‘grey areas’
that tested their resolve to support women’s/couples’ individual choice and autonomy, they
frequently argued it was not sufﬁcient simply to allow women/couples to express their own
reproductive autonomy, given their fears of the possible collective social effects of, for
example, rejection of carrier embryos and sex selection for social reasons. We found evi-
dence supporting Kerr’s (2004) questioning of the tendency for individual choice and
autonomy to be used as a fall-back position to unite otherwise quite disparate interests and
discourses. She believes the ideal of free, individual choice to be a chimera, as choices are
necessarily made within social contexts which produce unintended consequences and some-
times ‘impossible choices’ (2004: 72). We found that the fall-back position did not always
stand up in our discussions with staff. However, rather than seeing this as indicating a lack
of commitment to women’s/couples’ individual choice and autonomy, we suggest that this
occurs when staff attempt to achieve simultaneous facilitation and framing of choices for
women/couples. Efforts to achieve a more nuanced engagement through supporting and
shaping the capacity for autonomy and choice (Dodds 2000), whilst simultaneously
acknowledging the inherently complex social and ethical implications of their work, indi-
cate that relational autonomy may be a more suitable ethical model to describe the work
undertaken in this often controversial clinical context.
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